View source for Draft - Whatsaname

{{IETF}}

Over the last few years, the use of IP addresses for Internet
connectivity has changed dramatically.  The Name Space Research Group
(NSRG) has been chartered by the IRTF to review these changes, and
make recommendations on whether or not remediation within the
protocol stack is necessary.  This document reports the outcome of
some of the discussions within the research group.

One of the questiones addressed by the NSRG is: Does the TCP/IP
protocol suite need an additional level of naming above layer 3 but
below the application layer?  This document reviews the motivation
for an additional naming mechanism, reviews related work, proposes a
straw man "stack name" and discusses the structure and use of stack
names.

.
==<br/> 1. Introduction ==
The use of IP addresses in the Internet has changed over time.  While
routing of IP packets has remained largely unchanged, the use and
assignment of IP addresses has changed considerably.

For many years, hosts participating in an exchange of IP datagrams
could be named either by IP address or by a mnemonic domain name that
could be resolved to that address.  The static binding between name
and address allowed the interchangeable use of either to identify a
host.

However, several new developments have changed the nature of
addressing in the Internet:

*  dynamic IP addressing, as provided, for example, through PPP [1] and DHCP [2] 
*  private network address space and network address translators (NAT) [3] 
*  virtual hosts, where one host is assigned multiple IP addresses 
*  load sharing or load balancing, where one IP address is shared by multiple hosts, so the services at that address can be provided by multiple hosts The overall addressing model on the Internet has shifted to one of dynamic binding between a host and its address.  A host is assigned an address from place to place, or from time to time, when the host needs to assert a location in the network topology.  In addition, a single IP address can now be shared by multiple servers to represent a single logical end point.  The converse is also true - a single server can represent multiple logical endpoints, and not even have to use multiple addresses [4]. 

This is not the first document to point out the differences between
names, addresses, and routes.  Shoch delineated those differences as
early as 1978 [5].  Saltzer, et al., have also written about the
nature of naming and addressing [6][7].  Research into the nature of
names, addresses and routes can help provide insight into the current
situation, in which the function of IP addresses is overloaded to
serve the function of a location in the network, an interface, a host
name, and a portion of that which identifies a TCP connection.


Given the changing nature of the use of IP addresses for end point
identification on the network, is something more than IP addresses
and domain names needed to identify hosts?  What functionality would
that something bring to the table?

=== 1.1 Security Considerations ===
Communications today are secured through one of several means.  For
strongest protocol security, the communication is encrypted and the
ends are identified with verifiable public keys.  Several systems are
available today to do this, including SSH [8], the IPSEC mechanisms
of ESP [9] and IKE [10], TLS [11], and PGP [12].

The absence of a name space that uniquely identifies a host has
created problems in the design of ESP and AH (IPsec).  ESP and AH
should bind security associations to a name for a host that is
distinct from either a domain name or an IP address, because both
the DNS entry and the IP address can change, for example when a
host moves form one point in a network to another, while the
security association could remain valid.  Another advantage to a
name space that is independent of the network topology is that ESP
and AH could use such names for security associations that traverse
NAT devices.  In the absence of a persistent name in the Internet
Architecture, IP addresses are used for the binding of security
associations.  This is an architectural shortcoming, not a feature.

At a different level, there is an expectation that the routing system
guides a packet toward the destination end point indicated in the IP
destination address.  Until a few years ago, this would not have been
an unreasonable assumption.  Today there are exceptions, particularly
transparent web proxies and firewalls.

With some of the currently contemplated changes, the risk of a
transport connection being hijacked changes.  Instead of having to
intercept every packet, an attacker may only need to forge a
rebinding message to one end or the other of a connection.

=== 1.2 How Things Have Changed ===
As mentioned earlier, the nature of addressing in the Internet has
changed.  One important change in the Internet addressing model comes
from the use of NAT [13][14][15].  When a web client contacts a
server to request a web page, it is quite likely that the remote
address and TCP port, as it appears to the web server, will not be
the same as the host's source address and port used by the web
client.  Furthermore, it is likely to be difficult for the web client
to determine the address received by the server as the client's
address.  And, a host that has a NAT device between it and the
Internet cannot become a server because other clients have no way to
address it.

Another change to the addressing model in the Internet is that
computers are far more mobile than they were just a few years ago.

When a host moves from one location to another, its address changes
to reflect the change in its point of attachment to the Internet.

Because TCP bases its transport connection state on IP addresses, any
connections to the old address are lost (but see below).

One of the largest changes in the character of Internet usage
involves the resources people access and how they access them.

Whereas in the past one intended to access a particular host with a
particular IP address, today one is likely more interested in
accessing a service, such as a news service, or a banking service,
and one is less interested in the host upon which the service sits.

An industry has built up around the notion these so-called content
delivery or overlay networks.  The IP address of the web server
provides an ephemeral point of contact for a particular web page.  In
particular with secure services, what matters most to the user is
that a particular trusted company has verifiably provided the
service.

=== 1.3 Why Things Have Changed ===
The most important change the Internet has undergone is spectacular
growth.  The result of the growth has been shortages in address space
and routing resources.

As the growth of the Internet exploded so did address space
utilization.  A combination of measures, including the introduction
of private address space, NATs, and a tightening of policy by
addressing registries reduced the risk of the Internet running out of
allocatable addresses until the 2010 time frame (or later).  As a
result, however, the unique identification of a host and the
universal ability to reach it was lost.

At the same time, Internet routing tables exploded in size.  To
reduce routing tables routes, classless routing [16] was developed
and deployed to aggregate routes on bit boundaries, rather than on
old classful boundaries.  Next, the IANA discontinued its policy of
allocating addresses directly to end users and instead allocated them
hierarchically to providers, requiring providers to show sufficient
allocation and utilization to justify further assignments.  This
retarded for a time the explosion in routing, but it did not
eliminate growth.  While work continues in this area, it is important
to understand that as of this writing the aggregation of routes
through CIDR is the most efficient way to route Internet traffic,
given its current design goals.

There is a natural conflict between the above two policies.  If one
allocates addresses in small chunks, more routing entries will
result.  Periodically providers will renumber to get larger blocks,
at the inconvenience of all of their customers.

In summary, the Internet has exploded in size, NATs are now widely
present, and the use of mechanisms such as PPP and DHCP are widely
deployed.  In addition, services are now as much or more of interest
than are individual hosts.  Given all of these changes, is it
possible to add a new name space that will make connectivity more
stable and allow us to establish some new operating assumptions, such
as the ones that these complications broke?

==<br/> 2. Related Work ==
There exists a large body of work on name spaces and their bindings.

The work discussed below primarily relates to the binding of stacks
to IP addresses, with an eye toward mobility or transience.

=== 2.1 Mobile IP ===
Mobile IP addresses the problem of having a stable host identifier on
mobile hosts.  As a host changes its connection point to the network,
it updateds a home agent with the mobile host's new address.  The
home agent represents a static point through packets can be exchanged
with the mobile host.  Mobile IP provides a different solutions for
IPv4 [17] and IPv6 [18].  In IPv4, Mobile IP is a tunneling
mechanism.  In IPv6, mobile hosts make use of destination options.  A
mobile host uses its home address to create transport connections and
communicate with other hosts.  Datagrams exchanged with an IPv4
mobile host are tunneled through a home agent and optionally a
foreign agent, so that the mobile host's can be found in the routing
system without additional global routing overhead.  In IPv4 the home
agent is separate from the other end of a transport connection, and
packets take a triangular route.  In IPv6, support of mobility is
required, and the likely non-mobile host, the correspondent node, is
aware that the other end is mobile.  Therefore, once the mobile host
and remote host establish communications they can "short circuit" to
remove the home agent.  This is key because, while the foreign agent
is likely to be near the mobile host, the home agent is unlikely to
be near anybody.

<pre>
        _______                      ________
       |       |Care-of Address     |        | foreign agent optionally
       |Mobile |--------------------| Remote | forwards packets to mobile
       | Host  |                    | Agent  | host
       |_______|                    |________|
          ::Home Address                |
          ::                            |  home agent encapsulates and passes
          ::                            |  packets to the remote agent or
          ::                         ___|____  directly to the mobile node
          ::                        |        |
          ::                        | Home   |
          ::                        | Agent  |\  remote host sends packets
          ::                        |________| \ to home agent
          ::                                    \
          \\                                     \
           \\                                     \
            \\                                     \_____________
             \\  tunneled transport connection     |             |
              =====================================|Correspondent|
                                                   |    Node     |
                                                   |_____________|
</pre>

Figure 1: Mobile IPv4

In effect, Mobile IP turns the mobile node's IP address into a host
identifier, where the "care of" address is the host's current
location.  The way Mobile IP succeeds is that it uses tunneling
within the topology to represent an address at one location when it
is in fact at another.  However, a route to the mobile node's address
itself must be available within the topology at all times.  In an
IPv4 world this would be untenable because of constraints on both the
addressing and routing systems.  With IPv6, the addressing pressures
are off, and so each host can have a unique end address.  However,
problems remain with the routing system.  In addition, there is a
class of devices for which there may be no "home", such as devices in
airplanes, mobile homes, or constant travelers.  Additionally, there
is a desire within some of the mobility community to have
"micromobility" mechanisms that enable faster movement than
envisioned by Mobile IP.  The Routing Research Group (rrg) is
currently investigating this area.

Most importantly, a mobile device can't withstand the loss of the
home agent, even if the mobile device is still connected to the
network.  With the home agent offline, no incoming connections can
get to them, and long-lived communications cannot be re-established.

If the identity wasn't overloaded on the home address, it might be
possible to work around such a failure.

=== 2.2 Stream Control Transport Protocol (SCTP) ===
Many of the problems raised have to do with the use of layer 3
information at higher layers, such as the use of a layer 3 address as
the end point identifier for a TCP connection and the use of layer 3
addresses in the pseudo-header in TCP.  SCTP [19], an alternative to
TCP, uses IP addresses in a more dynamic way as the identifiers for
connection end points.  TCP transport connection end points are named
by IP addresses, and there are precisely two end point addresses, one
for each end.  SCTP allows multiple addresses per end, nominally for
redundancy of applications that require high availability.  However,
it is possible to move a connection as a host moves from one location
to another, or as its address changes due to renumbering (for
whatever purpose).  Work has progressed within the IETF to introduce
a new capability to SCTP, that allows connection end points to change
the set of IP addresses used for a connection [20].

There are three limitations to this idea.  For one, it only affects
those hosts that use SCTP, and therefore the idea is not sufficiently
general.

The second problem is that, as contemplated in the draft, the risk of
an attacker hijacking a connection is elevated.  This same problem
exists within Mobile IP, and may similarly be mitigated by purpose
built keys (see below).

Finally, because SCTP does not have a home agent, SCTP does not
handle the case when two nodes change their location at the same
time, a case some would argue is a corner case.

=== 2.3 Host Identity Payload (HIP) ===
Host Identity Payload (HIP) is a new approach to the problem of
naming end points [21].  It inserts an additional "name" between
layer 3 and layer 4, thus becoming layer 3.5.  The goal is to
decouple the transport layer from the Internet layer, so that changes
in the Internet layer do not impact the transport layer, and the
benefit is shared by all mechanisms atop transport protocols that use
HIP.

<pre>

_                ______________________________________
               |                                      |
               |            Application               |
               |______________________________________|
               |                                      |
               |             Transport                |
               |______________________________________|  The Host Stack
               |                                      |
               |         HIP or ESP w/ HI as SPI      |
               |______________________________________|
               |                                      |
               |             Internet                 |
               |______________________________________|
</pre>

Figure 2: Host Identity

HIP itself relies on a cryptographic host identity (HI) that is
represented in a Host Identity Tag (HIT) of various forms.  One is a
hash of the public key host identity, another is an administratively
assigned value coupled with a smaller hash of the public key host
identity.  Host identities can be public or anonymous, the difference
being whether or not they are published in a directory.

Whereas today one binds the transport layer to an IP address, HIP
proposes that the transport layer binds to a host identity tag (HIT).

The DNS is used to determine the HI and HIT, or to validate via
reverse lookup an HIT.  Further, the DNS continues to be used to get
an Internet address.

Whether one should want to decouple the transport layer from the
Internet layer is a controversial question.  After all, that coupling
has for many years provided the barest bones of the security of
knowing that the packets that make up the connection are being guided
through the network by routing tables in Internet routers that are
owned by people and organizations whose intent is to get one's
packets from source to destination.  If we divorce the transport
layer from the Internet layer, we introduce another way for an
attacker to potentially hijack connections.  HIP attempts to address
this through the use of public key verification.

Additionally, HIP raises an issue regarding other uses for
aggregation of IP addresses.  Today, they are not only aggregated for
purposes of reduced routing, but also for reduced administration.  A
typical access list used on the Internet will have some sort of a
mask, indicating that a group of hosts from the same subnet may
access some resource.  Because the value of a HIT is a hash in part,
only the administratively assigned value can be aggregated,
introducing an allocation limitation and authorization concerns.

On the other hand, there is the old computer science saying, any
problem can be fixed by an additional layer of indirection It should
be possible to administratively aggregate on groupings that are made
at higher layers.

An alternative approach would be to aggregate based on domain names,
rather than HI values.  draft-moskowitz-hip-arch-02.txt [21]
describes this approach in more detail.

A key concern with HIP is whether or not it will work in a mobile
world.  If the DNS is involved, or if any directory is involved, will
caching semantics eventually limit scalability, or are there mobility
mechanisms that can be employed to make use of directories feasible?

=== 2.4 Purpose Built Keys ===
Purpose built keys (PBKs) are temporary end point identifiers that
are used to validate a given endpoint during a communication [22].

PBKs are similar to HIP.  Rather than attempting to build an
infrastructure to validate the end points, however, PBK's sole
purpose is to ensure that two hosts that originate a communication
may continue that communication with the knowledge that at its
conclusion each end point will be the same end point it was at the
start.  Thus, even if one's address changes it is still possible to
validate oneself to the other side of the communication.

PBKs make no claim as to who the parties actually are.  They make no
use of public key infrastructures.  PBKs are themselves ephemeral for
the duration of a communication.

PBKs take the form of ad hoc public/private key pairs.  When a node
wishes to validate itself to another node it signs a piece of data
with its private key that is validated by the other end with the
public key.  The public key itself becomes an end point identifier.

PBKs might be instantiated in several different places in the stack;
for example, they may be carried in an IPv6 header extension or used
by an application protocol.

=== 2.5 RSIP and MIDCOM ===
Two related efforts have been made to stitch together name spaces
that conflict.  One is Realm Specific IP (RSIP) [23], which allows
the temporary allocation of address space in one "realm" by a host in
another realm, not unlike the way an address is gotten via DHCP.  The
benefit of RSIP is that it allows the end point to know what address
it is assigned, so that it may pass such information along in the
data path, if necessary.  The problem with RSIP is that host routing
decisions within the stack are very complex.  The host makes
decisions based on destination, a process that requires a fair amount
of configuration, and lacks certainty as it is based on a non-unique
IP addresses.  Because RSIP borrows public addresses it must
relinquish them as quickly as possible, or the point of NAT is
negated.  In order to make better use of the scarce public resource,
RSIP implementations would need to route not just on destination
address, but on application information as well.  For example,
internal hosts would probably not need external addresses merely to
browse the web.

MIDCOM, an architecture for middlebox communication, is a similar
approach [24].  However, rather than tunneling traffic, an agreement
between an end point and its agent and a "middle box" such as a NAT
or a firewall is made so that the end point understands what
transformation will be made by the middle box.  Where a NAT or a web
cache translates from one name space to another, MIDCOM enables end
points to identify that translation.

MIDCOM is contemplated for use by specific applications, and thus it
avoids the stack problems associated with RSIP.  However, neither
MIDCOM nor RSIP resolve how to discover such middle boxes.  Nor do
they provide a unique way for a host behind a NAT to identify itself
in an enduring way.  Finally, they both run into problems when
multiple NATs are introduced in a path.

=== 2.6 GSE or "8+8" ===
One proposal attempts to ease the conflict between the end systems'
need to have a fixed name for themselves, and the routing systems'
need for address assignments that minimize the overhead of routing
calculations [25].  The clash between these two needs produces either
the inconvenience (for the end systems) of renumbering, or routing
inefficiency and potentially poor address space utilization as well.

Known as 8+8, Global Site End system (GSE) would have split the
IPv6 address into two parts: a routing system portion that would be
assigned and managed by service providers that would change based
on routing system requirements, and a locally managed portion that
would be assigned and managed by terminal autonomous systems.

While each portion is globally unique, there are in effect two
addresses, one to get a packet to an autonomous system and another
to get to the host.  Further, end hosts might not be aware, at
least initially, of their routing portions.  It was envisioned that
the renumbering of the routing portion could be done as a matter of
signaling, with little
administrative involvement from the end point.  Another goal of GSE
was to eliminate additional routing overhead caused by multihomed end
systems, whose information must today be carried throughout the
routing system.  By allowing end enterprises to have multiple global
parts for purposes of multihoming, the terminal ASes would become
what are today's last-hop ISPs.

Separation of transport names and internet names could also occur by
having transports only use the local portion of the IP address in
their pseudo-header calculatioons.  There are a number of challenges
that GSE would have to overcome.  For one, how does one glue together
the provider portion of an address with the more local part, and how
would one accomplish the task securely?  Would doing so eliminate the
need or interest in adding other additional name spaces?

=== 2.7 Universal Resource Names ===
Universal resource names (URNs) do not provide us a mechanism to
resolve our naming concerns [26].  Rather, they may provide us the
form of the name to use, and perhaps a framework for resolution.  For
instance, a host identity may conceivably be represented as a URN.

URNs further the notion of defining a binding and boundaries between
the name of an object and its location.

==<br/> 3. Discussion: Users, Hosts, Entities and Stacks ==
The original addressing architecture of IP and TCP assumed that there
is a one-to-one relationship between an IP address and a
communicating "entity."  By "entity," we mean an identifiable
participant in an Internet communication.  Examples of an entity
include a host, a user, a client program or a service.  This one-to-
one relationship between IP address and entity was assumed to exist
throughout the duration of a "session" (usually a TCP connection);
that is, all of the IP datagrams exchanged during a session would
share the same endpoint identifiers, and the endpoint identifiers in
those datagrams would not be altered as the datagrams traversed the
Internet.

There is also an assumption that the binding between an entity and an
IP address would vary only infrequently over time.  The DNS allows
the binding between a domain name for a host and its IP address to
vary over time, but changes in those bindings may propagate slowly
and do not accommodate frequent changes.

As explained in section 1, the underlying addressing architecture of
the Internet has changed, leading to the need for new naming
mechanisms that function with host mobility, the instantiation of
multiple entities on a single host and the instantiation of a single
entity across multiple hosts, and that can provide security
independent of IP addressing.

When a host moves from one location to another, or when a host
receives a new address for some other reason, its identity has not
changed, nor has that of the person using it.  That entity may well
be in communication with other computers and have access rights to
network resources.  Indeed, multiple entities may be represented by a
single computer.

<pre>
              ______________________________
             |   ______          ______     |
             |  /_____ /|       /_____ /|   |
             | | APP  |f|      | APP  |b|   |
             | |------|o|      |------|a|   |
             | |TRANS |o|      |TRANS |r|   |
             | | PORT |.|      | PORT |.|   |
             | |------|c|      |------|c|   |
             | | IP   |o|      | IP   |o|   |
             | |______ m|      |______ m|   |
             | | MAC  |/       | MAC  |/    |
             | |______/        |______/     |
             |                              |
             |                              |
             |______________________________|

</pre>
Figure 3: One application: multiple stacks on a single device

Today, a host may represent multiple entities.  This happens when a
service provider hosts many web sites on one server.  Similarly, a
single entity may be represented by multiple hosts.  Replicated web
servers are just such an example.  These entities are "stacks",
instantiations of the TCP/IP model, be they across one or many hosts.

A stack is defined as one participant or the process on one side of
an end-to-end communication.  That participant may move and may be
represented by multiple hosts.

<pre>
               __________________   ________________________
              |                  | |                        |
              |   _______________| |____________________    |
              |  /_______________| |___________________ /|  |
              | |       A P P L I| |C A T I O N        |f|  |
              | |----------------| |-------------------|o|  |
              | |        T R A N | | P O R T           |o|  |
              | |----------------| |-------------------|.|  |
              | |         I N T E| |R N E T            |c|  |
              | |----------------| |-------------------|o|  |
              | |         F R A M| | I N G             |m|  |
              | |----------------| |-------------------| /  |
              | |________________| |___________________|/   |
              |                  | |                        |
              |__________________| |________________________|
</pre>
Figure 4: Another application: single stack represented by multiple hosts

Each instance of a stack has a name, a "stack name".  At an
architectural level the Name Space Research Group debated the value
of such names, and their associated costs.  Forms of this name are
used in numerous places today.  SSH uses public/private key pairs to
identify end points.  An HTTP cookie anonymously identifies one end
of a communication, in such a manner that both the connection and the
IP address of the other end point may change many times.  Stack names
are intended to identify mobile nodes, devices behind NATs, and
participants in a content delivery or overlay network.

When two devices represent a single end point they must share state
in order to keep the other end from becoming confused (to say the
very least).  When doing so, such stacks may indeed consist of
multiple processes on each end.  One view is that such processes can
theoretically be named independently of the Internet layer, allowing
for sessions to migrate at the behest of applications.  However, it
is not possible to standardize migration independent of applications
that retain state in all manner of places, from configuration files
to memory.  Additional names of such processes serve only to identify
those who are authorized somehow to represent the end point, and do
not themselves alleviate effort required to ensure application
consistency.

As used above, "sessions" are a mechanism that the current IP stack
does not formally provide.  If a session layer existed in the classic
sense it might sit above the transport layer, and a session could
consist of more than a single transport layer connection.  If the
session layer appears below the transport layer, then transport layer
connections can be bound to a name, such as a session identifier,
something other than that of the IP address, and transport layer
connections could persist across IP address changes.

=== 3.1 Requirements, desirable features and design decisions ===
Stack names are defined to be a new naming structure integrated into
Internet addressing, which provide a solution to several problems in
the current addressing architecture.  We have identified several
requirements for this naming structure.  Stack names will allow
continuation of sessions independent of host mobility or other host
renumbering.  A stack that spans several hosts is identified by a
single stack name, and multiple stacks on a single host are
unambiguously identified by separate stack names.  Stack names allow
authentication of stack identity, authentication of the origin and
contents of messages and privacy for message contents.  Finally, the
stack name architecture will interoperate with existing Internet
infrastructure, including existing host implementations and core
routing, for backward compatibility.

Stack names are intended to address as many of the problems in the
current Internet addressesing as possible, including: NAT, mobility,
renumbering, multiple entities on one host and entities that span
multiple hosts.  Stack names should be globally unique, so that state
about stack names, such as mapping information, need not be kept in
the network.  Stack names should also provide anonymity, so that
users or other entities cannot be easily identified through a stack
name.

These requirements and features lead to several design decisions:

*  Internal structure: opaque/structured, fixed-length/variable- length, universally-unique/random-unique 
*  Position in stack 
*  Mapping to mnemonic name (are stack names ever visible to humans?) 
*  Relationship between stack names and routing system 

=== 3.2 What do stack names look like? ===
Names may be structured or unstructured.  If they are structured,
what encoding do they use, and what is their scope? Is the length of
such a name fixed or variable?  Are stack names unique across the
Internet?  If so, are they guaranteed unique through some sort of a
registry or are they statistically unique?  If it is a registry, is
it centralized or distributed, such as the DNS?  The remainder of
this section summarizes the discussion within the NSRG on these
questions.

Again, one possibility is that stack names could be represented as
Mobile IP home addresses.  The benefit of this idea is that one might
well derive a large benefit without having to incur any additional
protocol engineering, at least initially.  By representing stack
names in this way the architectural distinction between stack name
and location is somewhat muddled.  If the goal is to separate
location and entities, where an IP address represents location, a
Mobile IPv6 answer doesn't get us to the goal.

==== 3.2.1 Uniqueness ====
The reason this document exists is that uniqueness is desirable.

Uniqueness offers certainty that a name represents exactly one
object.  A records from the DNS never were intended to have
uniqueness.  IP addresses, particularly in a V4 environment, no
longer have uniqueness.  Uniqueness allows people and programs to
build operating assumptions about the other end of a communication.

TCP was designed with such an assumption.

Being uniquely identified also raises security concerns.  What if you
don't want to be uniquely identified by generators of SPAM or by
powerful entities such as governments?  Note that we refer to the
uniqueness of the object referenced by the identifier.  An object
itself might have multiple names.

==== 3.2.2 Statistical uniqueness versus universal uniqueness ====
The classic way the model ensured uniqueness of names and addresses
on the Internet was to have those names and addresses assigned by
central authorities through a distributed tree-structured database.

The overhead for name assignment may be distributed through
delegation of authority.  While this mechanism for name assignment
guarantees uniqueness to the level of competence of those
authorities, such delegation introduces overhead, artificial markets,
trademark concerns, and other problems.

Some members of the NSRG are concerned that any new registry for
stack names would bring unwelcome and burdensome administrative costs
to connecting to the Internet, either as a service or a user.  One
could envision a very large reverse lookup domain that contains all
host identities, leaving little room for decentralization.

In particular two problems have cropped up with centralized name
spaces.  The first is that of domain squatting, where people buy a
name simply for its usefulness to others.  The second problem lies
with IP addresses, that are allocated and sold by providers.  Those
providers may choose to make a "service" out of making addresses
available to customers.  When designing a new name space, one should
introduce no artificial scarcity.

One way to avoid a new administrative overhead would be for
individuals to be able to generate statistically unique names.

However, statistically unique names can easily be mapped TO, but they
are less easily mapped FROM.  This is because it is difficult to
establish trust relationships necessary to make changes to the
mapping.  For instance, if a central authority controls the name
space, there must be some sort of authentication and authorization
model in place for the change to be allowed.  If such a mechanism is
in place, one has to wonder (a) why the names used for that
infrastructure are not used and therefore (b) why statistically
unique names would be of any advantage.

There was a consensus that if we were to introduce a new name space
it should not be mnemonic in nature.  The DNS exists for that purpose
today, and while others have recently identified a need to revisit
the DNS, that was not the purpose of this effort.

==== 3.2.3 Mapping ====
This brings into question several related concerns with naming: what,
if any, mapping mechanisms exist?  Should stack names map to IP
addresses, to domain names, or for that matter, to anything?  Do
domain names, X.509 distinguished names, or other names map to stack
names?  Each is a separate question.  A name on its own is of very
limited value.  The mappings infer how the name will be used.  Is a
stack name just something that sits in a transport control block on a
device?  In effect purpose built keys could accomplish that task.

==== 3.2.4 Anonymity ====
Related to uniqueness and mapping is anonymity.  Is it possible or
even desirable to have anonymous names?  That is, should my computer
be able to establish a communication to your computer, such that you
can be assured that you are communicating with the same entity who
used a particular name, without actually knowing the underlying
binding between the name and the object?

==== 3.2.5 Fixed versus variable length names ====
When the nature of the name is decided one must decide whether the
name should be of fixed or variable length.  Traditionally those
fields which are found in every packet tend to be fixed length for
performance reasons, as other fields beyond them are easily indexed.

The form the name takes will have some relevance to this decision.

If the name appears along the lines of an X.509 distinguished name,
it must be variable.  If the name is otherwise fixed length and
supposed to be universally unique, the field must allow for large
enough numbers to not require a protocol change anytime soon.

Similarly, if the name is statistically unique, the field must be
large enough so that the odds of a collision are acceptably low so
that the protocol needn't change anytime soon.  We leave it to
engineers to determine what "anytime soon" and "acceptably low" are.

A convenient feature of a variable-length name is that it allows for
ease of organizational delegation.  If one provides a hierarchical
model such as the DNS, one can decentralize authority to get a new
name or to change a name.  By the same token, such structure requires
a root authority from which distribution occurs.  So long as the name
itself is not a mnemonic, perhaps it is possible to limit problems
such as domain squatting.

Ultimately, if the name is to be other than statistically unique,
there will be some sort of central root service.

=== 3.3 At what layer are stack names represented? ===
Where are stack names represented?  Are they represented in every
packet, or are they represented in only those packets that the
underlying use requires?  The benefit of not requiring stack names to
appear in every packet is some amount of efficiency.  However, the
benefit of having them in every packet is that they can be used by
upper layers such as ESP.  In addition, end points would be able to
distinguish flows of packets coming from the same host even if the IP
address changes, or if the remote stack migrates to another piece of
hardware.  The PBK approach would alert an end point when one side
knows of such a change, but as we have seen, the IP address one side
sees, the other side may not, without a mechanism such as MIDCOM or
RSIP.  HIP and ESP solve this problem by putting an identifier
(either the HIT or SPI) in every packet.

If a stable Internet layer existed it might be possible to represent
stack names as IP addresses.  Even if a host moved, a stack name
could be represented as a Mobile IP "home" address.  The PBK proposal
suggests that stack names be passed as necessary as end to end
options in IPv6 or simply as options in IPv4.

If a stable Internet layer doesn't exist, then stack names must
appear above it.  If a new mechanism were inserted between the
Internet and transport layers, all end points that wish to use the
mechanism would need to change.

==== 3.3.1 A few words about transport layer mechanisms ====
One may not wish to completely divorce the transport layer from the
Internet layer, as currently implemented.  The transport layer
mechanisms today are largely responsible for congestion control.  If
one end point moves it is quite possible that the congestion
characteristics of the links involve will change as well, and it thus
might be desirable for mechanisms such as TCP Slow Start to be
invoked.  It is also possible that codecs may no longer be
appropriate for the new path, based on its new characteristics.  In
as much as mobile hosts change their locations and bindings with
Mobile IP today, this is already an issue.

=== 3.4 Stack names and the routing system ===
It would seem a certainty that the routing system would want very
little to do with stack names.  However, as previously mentioned,
when the binding between Internet and transport layers is broken,
some care must be taken to not introduce new security problems, such
that a connection cannot be hijacked by another host that pretends to
be authorized on behalf of an end point.

One misguided way to do this would be to enforce that binding in the
routing system by monitoring binding changes.  In order for the
routing system to monitor the binding, it realistically must be done
out in the open (i.e., not an encrypted exchange) and the binding
must appear at some standard point, such as an option or at a
predictable point in the packet (e.g., something akin to layer 3.5).

In other words, one would have gone all the way around from
attempting to break the binding between transport and Internet layers
to re-establishing the binding through the use of some sort of
authorization mechanism to bind stack names and Internet addresses.

=== 3.5 Is an architectural change needed? ===
The question of what level in the stack to solve the problem
eventually raises whether or not we contemplate architectural changes
or engineering enhancements.  There can be little dispute that the
topic is architectural in nature.  For one, there are now numerous
attempts to solve end point identification problems within the
engineering space.  We've already mentioned but a few.  The real
question is whether the existing architecture can cover the space.

Here there are two lines of thought.  The first is that the use of
mobility mechanisms and Mobile IP will cover any perceived need to
provide stack names.  Assuming that it can be widely and securely
deployed, Mobile IP certainly resolves many host mobility concerns.

However, it remains to be seen if it can address other problems, such
as those introduced by content delivery networks.

The other line of thought is that there is an architectural
distinction between names, addresses, and routes more explicit since
there is otherwise an overloading of operators.  Regardless of
whatever tactical benefit one might gain, architectural separation
should provide value in and of itself over time.  The risk of this
argument is that we will have introduced complexity without having
actually solved any specific problem, initially.

To resolve the differences between the two schools of thought
requires development of the second school of thought to the point
where it can be properly defended, or for that matter, attacked.

==<br/> 4. Conclusions or Questions ==
The NSRG was not able to come to unanimity as to whether an
architectural change is needed.  In order to answer that question, as
just noted in the previous section, the notion of a stack name should
be further developed.

Specific questions that should be answered are the following:

#  How would a stack name improve the overall functionality of the Internet?
#  What does a stack name look like?
#  What is its lifetime?
#  What is its lifetime?
#  Where does it live in the stack?
#  How is it used on the end points
#  What administrative infrastructure is needed to support it?
#  If we add an additional layer would it make the address list in SCTP unnecessary?
#  What additional security benefits would a new naming scheme offer?
#  What would the resolution mechanisms be, or what characteristics of a resolution mechanisms would be required?

Of the many existing efforts in this area, what efforts could such a
name help?  For instance, would a stack name provide for a more
natural MIDCOM design?

This document raises more questions than answers.  Further studies
will hopefully propose valid answers.

==<br/> 5. Further Studies ==
Various efforts continue independently.  One outgrowth is the
possibility of a HIP working group within the IETF.  Although this
work might occur within the IETF, it should be noted that there is a
risk to attempting to standardize something about which we yet have
the full benefit of having explored in research.

Work on relieving stress between routing and addressing also
continues within IETF working groups.

A separate effort proceeds elsewhere in the research community to
address what the Internet should look like ten years from now.  That
work may further conclude that stack names will play a considerably
larger role.

It is possible that work will continue within the IRTF.  However,
that work should be conducted by smaller teams until mature proposals
can be debated.  Questions of "whether additional name spaces should
be introduced" can only be answered in such a manner.

==<br/> 6. Acknowledgments ==
This document is a description of a review done by the Name Space
Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force.  The members of
that group include: J.  Noel Chiappa, Scott Bradner, Henning
Schulzrinne, Brian Carpenter, Rob Austien, Karen Sollins, John
Wroclawski, Steve Bellovin, Steve Crocker, Keith Moore, Steve
Deering, Matt Holdrege, Randy Stewart, Leslie Daigle, John Ioannidis,
John Day, Thomas Narten, Bob Moskowitz, Ran Atkinson, Gabriel
Montenegro, and Lixia Xiang.

Particular thanks go to Noel Chiappa whose notions and continuing
efforts on end points kicked off the stack name discussion.  The
definition of an endpoint is largely taken from Noel's unpublished
draft.  Thanks also to Ran Atkinson and Bob Moskowitz whose comments
can be found (in some cases verbatim) in this document.

The idea of GSE or 8+8 was originally developed by Mike O'Dell.  The
documents in which GSE is described are not published as RFCs.

[1]   Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51, RFC
1661, July 1994.

[2]   Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", RFC 2131,
March 1997.

[3]   Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address
Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, January 2001.

[4]   Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Nielsen, H., Masinter, L.,
Leach, P. and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.

[5]   Shoch, J., "Inter-Network Naming, Addressing and Routing",
Proceedings of IEEE Compcon, pp72-97, Fall 1978.

[6]   Saltzer, J., "On The Naming and Binding of Network
Destinations", September 1992.

[7]   Saltzer, J., Reed, D. and D. Clark, "End-To-End Arguments in
System Design", ACM Transactions on Computer Systems Vol. 2,
No. 4, November 1984.

[8]   Ylonen, T., Kivinen, T., Saarinen, M., Rinne, T. and S.

Lehtinen, "SSH Protocol Architecture", draft-ietf-secsh-
architecture-13.txt (work in progress), September 2002.

[9]   Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.

[10]  Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.

[11]  Dierks, T., Allen, C., Treese, W., Karlton, P., Freier, A. and
P. Kocher, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC 2246, January
1999.

[12]  Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H. and R. Thayer, "OpenPGP
Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.

[13]  Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775, February
2000.

[14]  Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT", RFC 2993,
November 2000.

[15]  Holdrege, M. and P. Srisuresh, "Protocol Complications with the
IP Network Address Translator", RFC 3027, January 2001.


[16]  Rekhter, Y. and T. Li, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)",
RFC 1771, March 1995.

[17]  Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", RFC 2002, October 1996.

[18]  Johnson, P. and C. Perkins, "", draft-ietf-mobileip-ipv6-18.txt
(work in progress), June 2002.

[19]  Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer,
H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L. and V. Paxson,
"Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.

[20]  Stewart, R., Ramalho, M., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., Rytina, I.,
Belinchon, M. and P. Conrad, "Stream Control Transmission
Protocol (SCTP) Dynamic Address Reconfiguration", draft-ietf-
tsvwg-addip-sctp-07.txt (work in progress), February 2003.

[21]  Moskowitz, B., "Host Identity Payload Architecture", draft-
moskowitz-hip-arch-02.txt (work in progress), February 2001.

[22]  Bradner, S., Mankin, A. and J. Schiller, "A Framework for
Purpose Built Keys (PBK)", draft-bradner-pbk-frame-04.txt (work
in progress), January 2003.

[23]  Borella, M., Lo, J., Grabelsky, D. and G. Montenegro, "Realm
Specific IP: Framework", RFC 3102, October 2001.

[24]  Srisuresh, P., Kuthan, J., Rosenberg, J., Molitor, A. and A.

Rayhan, "Middlebox communication architecture and framework",
RFC 3303, August 2002.

[25]  O'Dell, M., "GSE - an alternate addressing architecture for
IPv6", draft-ietf-ipngwg-gseaddr-00.txt (work in progress),
1997.

[26]  Handley, M., Thaler, D. and R. Kermode, "Multicast-Scope Zone
Announcement Protocol (MZAP)", RFC 2776, February 2000.

== Authors ==


: Eliot Lear
:Cisco Systems, Inc.
:170 West Tasman Dr.
:San Jose, CA  95134
:Phone: +1 408 527 4020
:EMail: lear@cisco.com

:Ralph Droms
:Cisco Systems, Inc.
:300 Apollo Drive
:Westford, MA  01824
:Phone: +1 978 497 4733
:EMail: rdroms@cisco.com